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Abstract—The proliferation in Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
which routinely collect sensitive information, is demonstrated
by their prominence in our daily lives. Although such devices
simplify and automate every day tasks, they also introduce
tremendous security flaws. Current insufficient security measures
employed to defend smart devices make IoT the ‘weakest’ link to
breaking into a secure infrastructure, and therefore an attractive
target to attackers. This paper proposes a three layer Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) that uses a supervised approach to detect
a range of popular network based cyber-attacks on IoT networks.
The system consists of three main functions: 1) classify the type
and profile the normal behaviour of each IoT device connected to
the network, 2) identifies malicious packets on the network when
an attack is occurring, and 3) classifies the type of the attack that
has been deployed. The system is evaluated within a smart home
testbed consisting of 8 popular commercially available devices.
The effectiveness of the proposed IDS architecture is evaluated
by deploying 12 attacks from 4 main network based attack
categories such as: Denial of Service (DoS), Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM)/Spoofing, Reconnaissance, and Replay. Additionally, the
system is also evaluated against 4 scenarios of multi-stage attacks
with complex chains of events. The performance of the system’s
three core functions result in an F-measure of: 1) 96.2%, 2)
90.0%, and 3) 98.0%. This demonstrates that the proposed
architecture can automatically distinguish between IoT devices
on the network, whether network activity is malicious or benign,
and detect which attack was deployed on which device connected
to the network successfully.
Index Terms—Internet of Things (IoT), Smart Homes, Net-
working, Security, Intrusion Detection, Anomaly Detection, Su-
pervised Machine Learning, Classification, Heterogeneity
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has
significantly increased over the past few years. This is due
to their ubiquitous connectivity, allowing them to communi-
cate and exchange information with other technologies, their
intelligence, and their decision making capabilities to invoke
actions [1]. This provides seamless user experiences which
significantly enhance people’s every day lives, and is demon-
strated by how prominent such devices are today. However, the
proliferation of smart devices is not only within the domestic
environment, but it is also the driving force behind the
development of an interconnected knowledge-based world; our
economies, societies, machinery of government, and Critical
National Infrastructure (CNI) [2]. More specifically, CNI con-
cepts such as smart homes, smart cities, intelligent transport,
smart grids, and health care systems are heavily dependent on
smart technologies and IoT devices. Nevertheless, although
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these concepts support the tasks of everyday life, their depen-
dency on Information Communication Technology (ICT) and
IoT devices come with tremendous security risks [3]. A survey
by Synopsys in May 2017 revealed a lack of confidence in the
security of medical devices with 67% manufacturers believing
that an attack on a medical device is likely to occur within
12 months, and only 17% of manufacturers taking steps to
prevent them [4].
The insufficient security measures and lack of dedicated
anomaly detection systems for these heterogeneous networks
make them vulnerable to a range of attacks such as data
leakage, spoofing, disruption of service (DoS/DDoS), energy
bleeding, insecure gateways, etc. These can lead to disastrous
effects; causing damage to hardware, disrupting the system
availability, causing system blackouts, and even physically
harm individuals [5], [6]. Therefore, it is clear that the
scale of impact of the attacks performed on IoT networks
can vary significantly. For example, a relatively simple and
seemingly harmless deauthentication attack can cause no sig-
nificant damage, but if performed on a device with critical
significance, such as a steering wheel in a wireless car, it
can pose a threat to human life. Consequently, it is obvious
that there is a major gap between security requirements and
security capabilities of currently available IoT devices. Two
of the main reasons that make these devices insecure include
restriction in computational power and heterogeneity in terms
of hardware, software, and protocols [7]. More specifically,
it is generally not feasible for IoT devices with restricted
computational power, memory, radio bandwidth, and battery
resource to execute computationally intensive and latency-
sensitive security tasks that generate heavy computation and
communication load [8]. As a result, it is not possible to
employ complex and robust security measures. Additionally,
given the diversity of these devices, it is very challenging to
develop and deploy a security mechanism that can endure with
the scale and range of devices [9].
A traditional IT security ecosystem consists of static perime-
ter network defences (e.g. firewalls, IDS), ubiquitous use
of end-point defences (e.g. anti-virus), and software patches
from vendors. However, these mechanisms cannot handle IoT
deployments due to the heterogeneity in devices and of their
use cases, and device/vendor constraints [10], [11]. This means
that traditional approaches of discovering attack signatures
(e.g. honeypots), will be insufficient and/or non-scalable [10].
Furthermore, as IoT devices operate deep inside the network,
traditional perimeter defences are inadequate as they can help
block external attacks, but they often fail to prevent attacks
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of IoT devices increases exponentially [13], the number of
unknown vulnerabilities and threats also increases, resulting
in perimeter defences becoming weaker. Traditional anomaly
detection systems are also ineffective within IoT ecosystems,
since the range of possible normal behaviours of devices
is significantly larger and more dynamic than traditional IT
environments. Popular Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) such
as SNORT and Bro, only work on traditional IP-only networks
as they are static and use signature-based techniques [10],
[14]. Finally, IDSs developed for Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) would also be ineffective in an IoT ecosystem mainly
because of their inability to adapt, their applicability only to a
single platform and protocol, and their small and specific range
of detection techniques [15], [10]. Despite major security
flaws related to IoT, according to Gartner [16] this sector is
expected to grow to 20.4 billion devices by 2020. As these
technologies have a direct impact on our lives, security and
privacy considerations must become a higher priority. There
is a need for an IDS to monitor malicious activity or policy
violations within a network of heterogeneous IoT devices and
subsequently understand their impact.
This paper is motivated by three main points, which align
with Zarpela˜o et al. [17] who provide a comprehensive lit-
erature review on the matter. Firstly, the majority of the
proposed systems focus on detecting a limited set of attacks; in
particular, routing attacks and DoS. In this case, the proposed
system aims to identify a larger set of attacks including multi-
stage attacks that represent complex combinations of attack
behaviour, which is significantly more challenging to detect.
Specifically, the IDS presented in this paper is evaluated
against 12 popular attacks from 6 categories found within the
IoT domain, but also against 4 scenarios of scripted multi-
stage attacks with complex chains of events. Secondly, existing
literature lack focus on device profiling. Detecting malicious
traffic is a challenging task without profiling the ‘normal’
behaviour of devices connected to the network. Therefore, in
this paper, the behaviour of 8 different IoT devices is profiled
so that unusual behaviour can be detected, and subsequently,
so can cyber-attacks. Thirdly, current IDSs fail to identify the
type of attack that has occurred. Without this information,
significant human effort is needed to respond to alerts and
determine the severity of an attack. However, in this paper, a
machine learning approach demonstrates that it is possible to
address this limitation by not only automatically distinguishing
between benign and malicious network traffic, thus detecting
whether an attack has been deployed, but also to automatically
identify the type of the attack that has occurred and against
which device. These two factors provide crucial information
that can help determine the severity of the cyber-attack, and
subsequently accelerate the launch of countermeasures to
defend against it. Thus, these features are implemented as part
of the proposed IDS. The experiments conducted in this paper
show that the performance of the system’s three core functions
result in an average F-measure of: 1) 99.7%, 2) 97.0%, and 3)
99.0%. This demonstrates that the proposed architecture can
automatically distinguish between IoT devices on the network,
whether network activity is malicious or benign, and detect
which attack was deployed on which device connected to the
network successfully.
To the best of our knowledge, the architecture of the IDS
proposed here is novel and addresses most of the aforemen-
tioned limitations of the existing systems. The main contribu-
tions of the work presented in this paper are:
• A three layer architecture for a lightweight, standalone
IDS tailored towards IoT devices within a smart home
network.
• An investigation into which attributes best represent pack-
ets as features in the context of supervised learning, so
that devices, maliciousness, and attacks can automatically
be identified.
• Resources that can further support research into automat-
ing IoT-based cyber-attack detection, such as benign and
malicious network activity datasets and a set of scripts
for automatically deploying attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Signature/Event/Rule based IDSs
Several studies revolving around IoT security have at-
tempted to design IDS systems tailored specifically for the IoT
ecosystem. Stephen and Arockiam [18] suggest a lightweight,
hybrid, and centralised approach aiming to detect Hello Flood
and Sybil attacks in IoT networks, which use the Routing over
Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) as a routing protocol.
Their system is based on an algorithm that uses detection
metrics such as number of packets received and transmitted to
validate the Intrusion Ratio (IR) by the IDS agent. Raza et al.
[19] implemented a real-time IDS for the IoT called SVELTE.
This system consists of a 6LoWPAN Mapper (6Mapper),
intrusion detection module, and a mini firewall. It analyses
the mapped data to identify any intrusions in the network.
Its performance in detecting various attacks seems promising.
owever, it has only been tested to detect spoofed or altered
information, sinkhole, and selective-forwarding attacks. Shree-
nivas et al. [20], [21] extended SVELTE by adding another
intrusion detection module that uses an Expected Transmission
(ETX) metric to identify malicious activity on the network.
They also proposed a geographic hint to detect malicious
nodes that conduct attacks against ETX-based networks. Their
results demonstrated that the overall true positive rate increases
when they combine the EXT and rank-based mechanisms.
Pongle and Chavan [22] propose a centralised and dis-
tributed architecture for a hybrid IDS, which they implemented
based on simulated scenarios and networks. It focuses on
detecting routing attacks such as the wormhole attack. Jun
and Chi [23] presented an event-processing-based IDS for the
IoT. This system is specification-based and it uses Complex
Event Processing techniques for attack detection. This system
collects data from IoT devices, extracts various events, and
performs security event detection by attempting to match
events with rules stored in a Rule Pattern Repository. Although
it is more efficient than traditional IDS, it is CPU intensive.
Summerville, Zach, and Chen [24] developed an IDS for IoT
based on a deep packet analysis approach which employs a
bit-pattern technique. The network payloads are treated as a
3sequence of bytes called bit-pattern, and the feature selection
operates as an overlapping tuple of bytes called n-grams.
When the corresponding bits matches all positions, a match
between the bit-pattern and n-grams occurs [21]. The system
is evaluated by deploying four attacks and demonstrates a very
low false-positive rate.
Midi et al. [15] proposed Kalis, a knowledge-driven, adap-
tive, and lightweight IDS. It collects knowledge about features
and entities of the monitored network and leverages it to
dynamically configure the most effective set of detection tech-
niques. It can be extended for new protocol standards, whilst at
the same time providing a knowledge sharing mechanism that
enables collaborative incident detection [21]. Results showed
that the system had a high accuracy in detecting mainly DoS
and routing attacks. Furthermore, Thanigaivelan et al. [25]
proposed a hybrid IDS for IoT. In this system, each node on
the network monitors its neighbor. If abnormal behavior is
detected, the monitoring node will block the packets from the
abnormally behaving node at the data link layer and reports
to its parent node. Oh et al. [26], implemented a distributed
lightweight IDS for IoT, which is based on an algorithm that
matches packet payloads and attack signatures. They evaluate
the IDS by deploying conventional attacks and by using attack
signatures from traditional IDSs such as SNORT. The results
demonstrated that this system’s performance is promising.
Finally, Ioulianou et al. [27] proposed a hybrid lightweight
signature-based IDS, in an attempt to mitigate two variations
of denial of service attacks; “Hello” flood and version number
modification. However, although their results look promising,
their system is tested in a simulated environment using Cooja
B. Machine Learning IDSs
Amouri, Alaparthy, and Morgera [28] developed an IDS
for IoT networks by applying supervised machine learning.
The IDS attempts to profile the benign behaviour of the
nodes and identify any anomalies on the network traffic. The
results demonstrate that the system is able to successfully
distinguish benign and malicious nodes. However, the IDS’s
performance is evaluated within a simulated network and not
a real testbed. Therefore, further evaluation is required to test
the efficiency of their system against a larger array of attacks
and devices. Doshi et al. [29], also employ machine learning
algorithms in IoT networks to detect Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks. They show that by focusing on IoT-
specific network behaviors (e.g., limited number of endpoints
and regular time intervals between packets) to inform feature
selection results in high accuracy of DDoS detection in IoT
network traffic with a variety of machine learning algorithms.
Nevertheless, they experiments solely focus on this type of
attack. Additionally, Shukla [30] proposed an IDS that uses a
combination of machine learning algorithms such as K-means
and decision tree, to detect wormhole attacks on 6LoWPAN
IoT networks. Nonetheless, results of this work are promising,
the evaluation of the proposed IDS was based on a simulation
and the effectiveness of the IDS has not been tested against
other attacks.
Meidan et al.[31] and McDermott et al. [32] both focus
on the detection of botnets in the IoT ecosystem and employ
deep learning techniques to achieve this. The results in both
cases are promising as they can successfully detect the botnets;
however, these methods have not been deployed to detect
a range of attacks and have been evaluated in a simulated
environment. Restuccia et al. [33] review the security threats
in IoT networks and discuss a potential security solution which
employs machine learning to detect and mitigate attacks using
polymorphic software and hardware. However, no description
of the experimental setup, implementation, and subsequently,
evaluation of the proposed system is provided. Brun et al.
[34] designed a deep learning-based approach using dense
Random Neural Networks for the detection of network attacks.
Although this approach often successfully detects attacks, the
system was evaluated on a testbed consisting of only 3 devices
and simplistic cyber-attacks were employed. Additionally, the
packet features were associated to specific attacks, for exam-
ple, to identify DoS attacks, the frequency of packets over a
specific period of time, limiting the attack space.
C. Attack Type Classification
Few approaches to classifying attack types currently exist.
Such approaches, however, have only been employed and eval-
uated in traditional networks. Therefore, as these approaches
were not designed to consider the specific requirements and
computational capabilities of IoT, it is challenging to employ
them in such environments. Bolozoni et al. [35] propose a
machine learning approach to classify the difference types
of cyber-attacks detected by Alert Based Systems (ABS). To
achieve this, byte sequences were extracted from alert payloads
triggered by a certain attack. Sequences were compared to
previous alert data. Although this technique is effective in
traditional systems, such approach relies on the alerts produced
by the ABS, which are not effective in IoT environments,
for reasons discussed in Section I. Additionally, as the de-
tection method uses payload values to detect attacks, attacks
which IoT systems are vulernable to and which do not alert
the payload (e.g. DoS) are not detected. Subba et al. [36]
implemented a model that uses feed forward and the back
propagation algorithms to detect and classify cyber-attacks in
desktop networks. However, to evaluate their system they used
the NSL-KDD dataset and attempted to classify probe, DoS,
User to Root, and Remote to User attack. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence that this system would be as effective if deployed
in a heterogeneous IoT environment, which consists of many
more protocols, devices, and network behaviours.
To summarise these approaches, Table I shows existing IDSs
for IoT and categorises them according to detection method,
security threat, validation strategy, and attack type classifica-
tion. As a result, it is evident that previous IDS proposals
dedicated for the IoT ecosystem are still at the early stages of
development. Several approaches have used data from network
simulations or have evaluated the system on a small array of
IoT devices, which may significantly decline from a realistic
environment. Additionally, such approaches focus on detecting
whether specific cyber-attacks have occurred, i.e. whether
packets are malicious or benign, and not classify the type of
attack. This is an important feature of an IDS, as specific
countermeasures can be employed for specific attack types.
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Stephen & Arockiam [18] Hello Flood/ Sybil Packet Metrics - -
Raza et al. [19] Sinkhole & Selective forwarding Hybrid Simulation -
Shreenivas et al. [20] Routing attacks against RPL protocol Hybrid Simulation -
Pongle & Chavan [22] Wormhole Anomaly-based Simulation -
Jun & Chi [23] - Specification-based - -
Summerville et al. [24] Worm propagation, SQL code injection,and directory traversal Anomaly-based Empirical (2 devices) -
Midi et al. [15] ICMP flood, Replication, Smurf Hybrid Empirical (2 devices) -
Thanigaivelan et al. [25] - Anomaly-based - -
Oh et al. [26] Routing Attacks Signature-based Empirical (1 device) -
Shukla [30] Wormhole Machine Learning Simulation -
Doshi et al. [29] DDoS Machine Learning Empirical (2 devices) -
Amouri et al. [28] Identifies Malicious Nodes Machine Learning Simulation -
McDermott et al.[32] Botnets Machine Learning Simulation -
Meidan et al. [31] Botnets Machine Learning
Empirical (9 devices,
3 types: doorbell, camera,
thermostat)
-
Restuccia et al. [33] - Machine Learning - -
Brun et al. [34]
UDP Flood, TCP SYN,
Sleep Deprivation Attack,
Barrage Attack, and Broadcast Attack
Deep Learning Empirical (3 devices) -
Proposed system
various reconnaissance (quick scan, intense scan, etc.)
iot-scanner,
various DoS (tcp/udp/hello flood),
various man-in-the-middle (ettercap, ARP) ,
replay attack,
ARP & DNS spoofing,
4 multi-stage scripts
Machine Learning
Empirical (8 devices,
6 types: plugs, cameras,
hubs, sensors,
voice controlled, lamps)
yes
TABLE I: Summary of current work on Intrusion Detection Systems for Internet of Things
III. METHODOLOGY
A. System Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed IDS archi-
tecture. Specifically, the first layer of the tool will scan the
network, identify the connected IoT devices based on their
MAC addresses, and classify them based on their network
behaviour. At the second layer, the packets from such devices
are classified as whether they are benign or malicious. Finally,
if malicious packets have been detected in the second layer,
the third layer will classify these malicious packets as one of
four main attack types. As a result, in an event of an attack,
the output of the system is: 1) the MAC address of the device
under attack, 2) whether the packet is malicious, and 3) the
type of attack which has occurred, which is one of the four
main categories that the model was trained on.
B. IoT Smart Home Testbed
According to Cisco’s VNI report [37], in 2017, the average
household in North America, Western Europe, and Central
and Eastern Europe has on average 8, 5.4, and 2.5 smart
devices respectively. The testbed used to support the exper-
iments provided in this paper consists of 8 commercially
popular IoT devices; and thus is a representative example of
a traditional smart home. Such devices included the Belkin
NetCam camera, TP-Link NC200 Camera, TP-Link Smart
Plug, Samsung Smart Things hub, Amazon Echo Dot, British
Gas Hive connected to two sensors: a motion sensor and a
window/door sensor, and Lifx Lamp. Additionally, a laptop
was also connected to the network to perform two tasks:
1) continually record the network traffic and automatically
generate and save the log files, and 2) deploy various network
based attacks. Figure 2 displays the architecture of the smart
home testbed.
IoT device Type Protocol(s)
Amazon Echo Dot Multimedia Ethernet
Belkin NetCam Multimedia WiFi
TP-Lik NC200 Multimedia WiFi
Hive Hub Sensors Ethernet & ZigBee
Samsung Smart Things Hub Sensors Ethernet & BLE
TP-Link SmartPlug Sensors WiFi
Apple TV Multimedia WiFi
Lifx Smart Lamp Lamp WiFi & ZigBee
TABLE II: IoT devices included in the smart home testbed
In order to collect the network traffic from the IoT testbed,
tcpdump was scheduled to run on the access point (P1) as
shown in the same Figure. The collected PCAP logs were
then transferred and stored in the syslog server.
C. Data Collection
1) Benign Network Data: To conform to other comparable
research (e.g. [38]), 3 weeks worth of benign data and 2
weeks of malicious data was collected from the IoT testbed.
The testbed described in Section III-B was designed and
implemented so that all the packets on the network (local-to-
local or local-to-remote) were captured. All the inbound and
5Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed architecture for the three layer Intrusion Detection System.
Fig. 2: IoT smart home testbed network architecture.
outbound traffic from the smart devices was captured using
the tcpdump [39] tool, which was continually running on the
Access Point (indicated in Figure 2 with red circular marker).
The data collection process was automated using Cron jobs
and bash scripts. Data frames were continuously captured
and saved to the Syslog Server in a pcap format. Files were
generated in one-minute intervals and were accessed remotely
by using Secure Shell (SSH) to connect to the Syslog Server.
For the purposes of benign data collection, pcap files were
automatically transferred and merged to the Syslog Server
using Cron jobs that invoke a series of bash scripts.
2) Cyber-Attacks in IoT ecosystems: Multiple studies (e.g.
[22], [40], [41], [15]) have demonstrated that IoT devices
are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks including network
attacks, physical attacks, firmware attacks, and data leak-
age. Some of the reasons why such devices are insecure
include: limitations in computational power, lack of trans-
port encryption, insecure web interfaces, lack of authentica-
tion/authorisation mechanisms, and their heterogeneity which
makes applying uniform security mechanisms extremely chal-
lenging [42]. Consequently, several IoT attack categories have
emerged:
• Denial of Service (DoS): aims to make IoT devices
unavailable to its intended users by temporarily or in-
definitely disrupting their services [43].
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)/Botnets: an at-
tacker aims to compromise a large amount of vulnerable
IoT devices in order to be able to deploy a significantly
more severe DoS or other attacks [44].
• Man-In-The-Middle: compromises the communication
channel between the IoT device and the intended recipient
of its data. Once the connection is compromised, the
attacker is able to act as a proxy and therefore read, insert,
and modify the transmitted data [45].
• Spoofing: manipulates fake identities to compromise the
effectiveness of the IoT device by forging a large number
of identities to act as legal nodes [8].
• Insecure Firmware: compromises user data, control over
the IoT device, and attacks against other devices [42].
• Data Leakage: Many IoT devices suffer from the lack
of transport encryption. This can result in data loss, and
depending on the data exposed, could lead to complete
compromise of the device or user accounts [42].
Acquiring 3 weeks of malicious activity required the design
and deployment of a range of malicious attacks. The machine
designated to run the malicious attacks was a Lenovo Thinkpad
configured to run the Kali Linux operating system [46].
Although most IoT devices are connected to the Internet
via WiFi, they also support other communication protocols
such as Ethernet, IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Z-Wave,
LoRaWAN, and Cellular (GPRS/2G/3G/4G). However, in this
paper, WiFi and Ethernet communications are used. Table III
demonstrates all the attacks performed and the tools used
within this work.
To ensure that the IDS was tested appropriately, it was im-
portant to generate a broad data-set, representative of the per-
formed attacks. In particular, it was essential to introduce some
randomness to the deployed attacks in order to avoid model
overfitting. For this reason, bash scripts were implemented to
automate and randomize the malicious attacks. Randomization
6Attack Category Method
Reconnaissance Nmap (Quick Scan, Intense Scan, etc.), iot-scanner
DoS/DDoS TCP Flood/UDP Flood, Hello flood attacks
MITM Ettercap, SSL Strip, Burpsuit
Replay mitmframework suite
Spoofing DNS, ARP
TABLE III: Cyber-attacks that were deployed on the IoT
testbed
was achieved by implementing a timer that launched the
attacks at random for a random period of time (between 5
seconds and 20 minutes). The idle time in between each attack
launch was also randomized using the same principle. For
some attacks, such as the iot-toolkit toggle attack, the intensity
of the attack (e.g. the amount of malicious packets sent to the
device) was also randomized. Moreover, four automated multi-
level malicious scenarios were implemented and deployed on
the network. This is to increase the complexity of the attacks,
but also to represent the steps that a real adversary would
follow when attacking the devices.
1) Scenario 1: network scanning
The attacker performs either one quick scan or two
scans, with the second one being a more in-depth and
targeted reconnaissance attempt. The script will perform
the second attack with probability 0.5. The rationale for
this scenario is that the attacker will usually commence
their attack with a quick scan to determine available
hosts and then decide whether to proceed to a more
complex one to search for vulnerabilities if needed.
2) Scenario 2: network scanning & Denial(s) of Service
This scenario also incorporates a quick scan but the
attacker also performs one or more of the most common
DoS attacks on the target network. Up to 6 DoS attacks
can be performed in a row. Random attack duration as
well as random wait times in between the attacks are
used. The scenario is targeting a random IP address
identified on the predefined network.
3) Scenario 3: network scanning & MITM
This scenario represents a quick reconnaissance but
is followed by a MITM attack performed via ARP
spoofing, either with passive monitoring only or also
using the packet injection (chosen at probability of 0.5).
Random attack times, wait times, as well as random
number of injected packets are selected automatically.
The MITM is always set in between the access point
and one of the IP addresses present on the network
(identified at the beginning of the script).
4) Scenario 4: complete attack with iot-toolkit
An end-to-end automation of the iot-toolkit attacks
from the previously described framework. It targets
the TP-Link devices for reconnaissance and performs
toggle/get info on the TP-Link smart plug. Again, ran-
dom duration, intensity, and wait times are selected
automatically.
Another crucial concept that was considered during the
development of the scripts was to generate logs of when each
type and variation of attack took place. This was necessary for
further labeling tasks needed for supervised machine learning,
and for validation that the attacks worked as expected. A
general log was generated to provide an outline of the dates
and types of attacks performed. Additionally, logs of all the
outputs generated during the attacks (including output returned
by the tools) were created for debugging purposes.
D. Feature Selection
The main requirements to consider when developing a
machine learning based IDS for IoT are:
• Lightweight - not require considerable computational
processing power.
• Stand-alone - not dependent on any other software or alert
based system.
• Fast - malicious activity must be detected in almost real
time to reduce impact.
• To work over encrypted traffic - most commercial IoT
devices employ transport encryption.
Given the above requirements, it was decided to initially
investigate whether it is possible to detect malicious behaviour
from single packets. The reasoning behind this approach is
that, as single packets are the smallest piece of network
information, they are quicker to processes, and subsequently
improve the speed of identifying malicious activity.
The raw PCAP files containing the network packets were
initially converted and represented in a Packet Description
Markup Language (PDML) [47] format. PDML conforms
to the XML standard and contains details about the packet
dissection/layers. As a result, it allows access to all the packet
attributes that can be used as features. A network packet
consists of a series of layers (Physical, Data Link, Network,
Transport, and Application), each layer being a child of the
previous layer, built from the lowest layer up [48] (see Figure
3). Each layer, has its own header composed of a range
of different fields providing information, and a payload. For
the classification experiments discussed in this work, all the
fields that compose each of the aforementioned layers were
extracted, in order to investigate which ones are most relevant
in detecting benign and malicious behaviour on IoT.
In addition to these attributes, few more fields were also
included such as: frame information [39] and packet type
- which specifies whether the data packet was inbound or
outbound to an IoT device on the testbed. Additionally,
features that represented identifying properties were removed
(e.g. source IP address, time, packet ID) to ensure the model
was not dependent on specific network configurations and
that the features of the network behaviour were captured,
rather than the network actors and devices. Finally, because
the network traffic is encrypted, the payload information from
the Application Layer was not considered as a feature. In total,
121 features were extracted from each packet and represented
as a feature vector (see Table IX in Appendix A).
E. Data Labeling
Supervised machine learning requires labelled training data.
In this paper, 3 classification experiments were conducted
for each dataset: (1) device type classification, (2) malicious
7Fig. 3: An example of how layers are structured within a packet.
packet detection classification, and (3) attack type classifica-
tion.
For (1) and (2), it was detected that the IP address of the IoT
devices on the testbed would change repeatedly under specific
attacks. IP addresses were therefore not suitable indicators to
associate a class label to packets. The MAC addresses of
such devices were therefore used to associate packets. For
(3), as attacks were systematically performed, packets were
labelled as their attack type upon completion. To ensure that
the labeling of the malicious packets was implemented as
accurately as possible, two parameters were considered: the
launch time of the attack and the MAC address of the attacker’s
machine. As a result, every time that an attack was launched,
we noted the exact time and associated it with the MAC
address of the laptop used to deploy it. Therefore any packets
with a time-stamp within a specific attack time frame that also
had the attacker’s MAC address, were labeled as malicious.
Finally, on the attacker’s machine services/applications such
as mail and web browsers were deactivated, in order to avoid
mislabeling any benign packets from the same machine as
malicious. The class labels for each classification experiments
are as follows:
• (1): Amazon Echo Dot, Belkin Net, TP-Lik NC200, Hive
Hub, Samsung Smart Things Hub, TP-Link SmartPlug,
Lifx Smart Lamp, Firewall, Access Point.
• (2): A packet was labeled as malicious if it was collected
during an attack which targeted a device on the IoT
testbed. The packet was labeled as benign if otherwise.
• (3): DoS, MITM, Scanning, iot-toolkit.
Figures 4 - 6 show the distribution of packets across all
classes for each experiment.
Fig. 4: Distribution of packets across IoT devices
F. Class Balancing and Sample Size Reduction
An uneven balance of class labels across each classification
experiment (Figures 4 - 6) has the potential to negatively affect
classification performance. Additionally, datasets containing a
significantly large number of packets such as those produced
Fig. 5: Distribution of packets across attack detection
Fig. 6: Distribution of packets across attack types
here, require high computational power and processing time
when applying machine learning algorithms.
Weka [49], a popular suite of machine learning software,
was used to support classification experiments. Given the
significant uneven balance across the datasets and the signif-
icantly large number of packets to be classified, the spread
subsampling and class balancing filters available in Weka were
applied to generate a random subsample of packets and to
subsequently balance the distribution of classes within those
samples.
For device type classification, the sample size was acquired
at random from a total of 2,004,657 packets. The final sample
size was 10,000 packets, with 1,000 packets per device. For
detecting whether an attack is malicious or not, the dataset was
sampled at random from a total of 220,785 packets to contain
80,000 packets (40,000 and 40,000 of benign and malicious
packets respectively). Finally, for classifying the type of attack,
the final sample size was set to acquire a sample of 50,000
packets (10,000 packets per attack) from a total of 220,785
packets.
8IV. ALGORITHM SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
EXPERIMENTS
To explore how well classification algorithms can learn to
profile IoT devices on the network, detect wireless attacks, and
classify the type of such attacks, the performance of supervised
machine learning when the corresponding network activity
data was used to train and evaluate the classification model.
In the case of identifying whether a packet is malicious
or benign, classification is evaluated relative to the training
dataset, producing four outputs:
• true positives (TP) - packets are predicted as being
malicious, when they are indeed malicious.
• true negatives (TN) - packets are predicted as being
benign, when they are indeed benign.
• false positives (FP) - packets are predicted as being
malicious, when in fact, they are benign.
• false negatives (FN) - packets are predicted as being
benign, when in fact, they are malicious.
There are several measures which can be used to evaluate
the performance of a classifier. The goal is to maximise
all measures, which range from 0 to 1. Therefore, higher
values correspond to better classification performance. The
most common measures are precision, recall, F-measure, and
accuracy.
Precision (P) measures the proportion of malicious packet
identifications was correct, whereas recall (R) measures what
proportion of malicious packets were identified correctly. The
two measures are often used together in F-measure (F), which
calculates the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and
provides a single weighted metric to evaluate the overall
classification performance. Such measures are calculated using
equations in Equation 1.
P =
TP
TP + FP
, R =
TP
TP + FN
, F = 2 · P ·R
P +R
(1)
Others use accuracy as a measure of performance. Accuracy
measures the number of packets that were correctly classified.
However, the problem of using accuracy to measure the
effectiveness of a classifier is that if the classifier always
predicts a particular class, a strategy that defeats the purpose
of building a classifier, it will achieve high accuracy.
In order to perform classification experiments, a random
subset of 60% of each balanced dataset described in Section
III-F were selected for training, with the remaining 40% used
for testing. The “no free lunch” theorem suggests that there
is no universally best learning algorithm [50]. In other words,
the choice of an appropriate algorithm should be based on its
performance for that particular problem and the properties of
data that characterize the problem. In this case, a variety of
classifiers distributed as part of Weka were evaluated.
To comply with other IDSs which employ machine learning
techniques to detect cyber-attacks in the traditional and IoT
networks (e.g. [51], [52]), 9 classifiers were selected based
on their ability to support multi-class classification, high-
dimensional feature space, and the time it takes for the clas-
sification model to classify unseen data. Classifiers included
generative models that consider conditional dependencies in
the dataset or assume conditional independence (e.g. Bayesian
Network, Naive Bayes), and discriminative models that aim
to maximise information gain or directly maps data to their
respective classes without modeling any underlying probability
or structure of the data (e.g. J48 Decision Tree, Support
Vector Machine). Moreover, the aforementioned algorithms
were also chosen as they produce classifications models that
can be easily interpreted, allowing a better understanding of
the classification results.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table IV reports the overall weighted-averaged performance
for all 9 classifiers, including their classification time. Overall,
Weka’s implementation of J48 decision tree method [53] with
pruning achieved the best performance, resulting in an F-
measure of 99.7%, 97.0%, and 99.0% and a classification
time of 0.1 seconds, 0.4 seconds, and 0.2 seconds for each
experiment respectively.
To ensure that the J48 classifier is not over-fitting, we
performed additional experiments which result in no change
in the classification performances:
• Classification using an unpruned decision tree.
• As the feature space is relatively large, all packet features
may not be relevant. Two main feature selection methods
were used to identify the most relevant features; Correla-
tion Attribute Evaluation Filter and Gain Ratio Attribute
Evaluation Filter provided in Weka. The latter evaluates
the worth of an attribute by measuring the correlation
between it and the class and the former evaluates the
worth of an attribute by measuring the information gain
with respect to the class. Results showed, that from 121
features (Figure 8, 7), 10 were ranked to have the highest
correlation within the feature space. Further classification
was performed using only the highly correlated features
are present.
• 10-fold cross validation experiments.
Figures 7 and 8 show the features among the top 10 which
affect the decision tree: icmp fields, IP and TCP flags, packet
and frame length, and TCP destination port. Specifically,
when present, ICMP code options such as fragment protection
and packet protection can indicate a DoS attack. Moreover,
scanning methods and DoS (e.g. syn flood) mostly involve
having modified TCP flags to invalid or improper settings.
Additionally, specific TCP flag responses such as TCP SYN
check and TCP SEQ check, can indicate a MITM attack.
As a result, the various combinations of flags are crucial
indicators of malicious activity. IP flags are indicators of IP
fragmentation attacks and can take several forms such as UDP
(an attack used against the IoT) or ICMP packet transmission.
This ultimately can be considered as being a type of DoS as
they make the device unavailable. The destination port of a
packet is another useful feature for detecting activity such as
port scanning which generally involves several probes to one
or more ports. Packet length is also an indicator of malicious
behaviour, specifically when the packet is significantly larger
or smaller than usual.
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Classifier P R F Time (sec) P R F Time (sec) P R F Time (sec)
Naive Bayes 79.0 57.0 65.0 40.4 93.0 93.0 93.0 1.5 92.0 91.0 91.0 6.2
Bayesian Network 96.0 96.0 96.0 28.3 96.3 96.4 96.4 1.2 96.5 96.5 96.0 3.1
J48 98.8 98.0 98.0 41 97.0 97.0 97.0 0.4 99.0 99.0 99.0 0.2
Zero R 17.0 17.0 17.0 0.2 29.0 31.0 49.0 0.6 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.2
OneR 79.0 84.0 87.0 20 93.0 93.0 93.0 0.2 92.0 92.0 92.0 0.2
Simple Logistic 96.0 96.0 96.0 65.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 46.0 96.4 96.5 96.5 45.0
Support Vector Machine 89.0 70.0 82.0 >30mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins
Multi-Layer Perceptron N/A N/A N/A >30mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins
Random Forest 96.0 96.0 96.0 2.24mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins N/A N/A N/A >30mins
TABLE IV: Weighted average of the results of all nine classifiers, following 60-40 percentage split testing for all three
experiments.
Fig. 7: Top 10 features following correlation attribute filtering
Fig. 8: Top 10 features following gain ratio attribute filtering
To gain a better insight into the performance of the classifier
across the experiments, the confusion matrices in Tables V-
VII, which show how the predicted classes for individual
packets compare against the actual ones, were analysed.
When profiling devices, the classifier demonstrated a
high percentage of correct predictions, thus less often mis-
classifying devices. For example, Lifx Smart Lamp, Sam-
sung Smart Things Hub, and Belkin Net demonstrated few
confusion and were generally correctly classified. This may
be explained by the fact that such devices are distinct, and
thus, so are their network behaviours. In this case, features
may exist in some packets from one device, but are missing
in packets from others. For example, the behaviour of the
TP-Link NC200 is notably different in comparison to the
behaviour of the TP-Link SmartPlug as the tasks they exist
to perform are different. In this case, a feature within the TP-
Link NC200 packets include the connectionless protocol, User
Datagram Protocol (UDP), whereas the TP-link SmartPlug
packets use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). However,
in some cases, confusion often occurred where Belkin Net
and Hive Hub, were misclassified. These confusions may be
explained by the fact that such devices may have incurred
similar network behaviour during data collection, such as when
firmware updates were deployed.
Detecting whether network packets are malicious or benign
and identifying the type of wireless attacks demonstrated very
little confusion. This could be explained by the fact that the
attacks that were performed during data collection were off-
the-shelf attacks, i.e. resources which include attacks that are
freely available, such as hping, nmap, iot-toolkit, etc., and
are unsophisticated. In this case, the features of malicious
and benign packets are distinct, and thus, few classification
confusions occurred. For instance, malicious packets may
contain different flag values which indicate an attack has
occurred as explained earlier.
A. Experiments using Unseen Validation Datasets
To evaluate the performance of the trained models generated
in Section V even further, the trained classifiers were applied
to unseen datasets. Such datasets included packets that were
collected in Section III-F, but were not included as part of the
sample set used to originally train and test the classifiers.
More specifically, for device type classification, the unseen
dataset contained 40,000 packets in total, with 10,000 packets
generated from each of the four IoT devices on the testbed.
For classifying malicious packets, the unseen dataset contained
a total of 4,200 packets, 2,100 malicious and 2,100 benign
packets. Finally, for classifying the attack type, the unseen
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Predicted
a b c d e f g
Actual Amazon Echo Dot a 1,647 0 2 3 0 0 0
Belkin Net b 1 1,647 0 1 0 1 0
Hive Hub c 0 304 1,389 4 0 0 2
Samsung Smart Things Hub d 0 0 0 1,679 0 0 1
Lifx Smart Lamp e 0 0 0 0 1,679 0 0
TP-Link NC200 f 0 0 0 0 0 1,610 9
TP-Link SmartPlug g 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,677
TABLE V: Device type confusion matrix which demonstrates how the predicted classes for individual packets compare
against the actual ones
Predicted
a b
Actual Malicious a 43,967 26
Benign b 4 44,317
TABLE VI: Attack detection confusion matrix which
demonstrates how the predicted classes for individual packets
compare against the actual ones
Predicted
a b c d
Actual DoS a 3,392 12 0 0
MITM b 0 3,484 12 0
Scanning c 0 15 3,427 0
iot-toolkit d 0 61 15 3,334
TABLE VII: Identifying attack type confusion matrix which
demonstrates how the predicted classes for individual packets
compare against the actual ones
dataset contained 436 packets, 109 packets for each of the
four attacks.
As shown in Table VIII, the results demonstrate that for
the device type classification and for identifying malicious
packets, the accuracy of the classifiers dropped notably (from
98.8% to 96.2% and from 97.0% to 90% respectively). How-
ever, the performance of the classifier in distinguishing the
types of attacks, did not change significantly (from 99.0% to
98%).
Device profiling Detect wireless attacks Attack type
P R F P R F P R F
96.2 96.8 96.9 90.0 89.9 88.8 98.0 99.0 99.0
TABLE VIII: Classification performance for each experiment
on unseen validation data using the trained J48 models
To conclude, the key insights of these results are:
• Decision trees (in particular, J48) seem to be the best
algorithm for this task as it achieved the best classification
results across all three experiments.
• IP and TCP flags are the most important features.
• For device classification, the confusion matrix indicated
that the classifier less often misclassified devices.
• For detecting malicious packets, the confusion matrix
indicated that the classifier also demonstrated very little
confusion.
• The high accuracy of the classifier can be explained by
the fact that the deployed attacks were not sophisticated
and deployed using out of the self tools. As a result,
the traffic and network behavior during these significantly
changes.
• When unseen validation datasets are used to further
evaluate classification performance, the accuracy notably
dropped for device type classification and detecting ma-
licious packets. Though, it did not change significantly
when distinguishing attack types.
B. Use Case
The main use case for the IDS proposed in this paper is to
be able to detect real time malicious behaviour in smart home
IoT devices and identify the type of attack which has occurred.
However, IoT in its own right is a large concept which includes
a significant number of heterogeneous devices.
Larger networks with several other IoT devices are tradi-
tionally segmented into sub-networks, each including a set of
devices. In this case, when considering the scaling up of the
proposed IDS in this paper, to detect malicious activity in
environments with more devices the IDS can be deployed
on each sub-network. Having several instances of the IDS
may ultimately lead to sharing network activity data between
each sub-network. The data from one sub-network containing
different device to other sub-networks may be used to train
the IDS to identify malicious activity in such devices when
they are newly connected to the sub-network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel and intelligent architecture of a
three layer IDS is presented. To address the aforementioned
limitations of current systems, the IDS presented here includes
three main functions: 1) classify the type and profile the
normal behaviour of each IoT device connected to the network,
2) detect wireless attacks deployed against the connected IoT
devices, and 3) classify the type of the attack that has been
deployed. In order to evaluate the performance of applying
a supervised machine learning approach to automate each
function, network activity data from a real testbed consisting
of a variety of commercially available and popular IoT devices
was collected. The performance of the systems three core
functions result in an F-measure of: 1) 96.2%, 2) 90.0%, and
3) 98.0%. This demonstrates that the proposed architecture can
successfully distinguish between IoT devices on the network,
whether network activity is malicious or benign, and detect
which attack was deployed on which device connected to the
network automatically.
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In addition to the experimental results, this study provides
resources that can further support research into automating
IoT-based cyber-attack detection. Such resources include raw
PCAP files and flow information for benign and malicious
network activity, a set of scripts to automatically launch
attacks from five main network attack categories discussed in
this paper, and further scripts to automatically launch multi-
level attacks which represent the behaviour of an attacker
to create an authentic malicious dataset. All resources are
freely available to the research community to support further
investigations into several aspects of IoT. The scripts are
available to download here: https://goo.gl/iCJ525, and https:
//goo.gl/anB6eU. Due to the vast size of the data collected
in this paper, it can be accessed on request by contacting the
corresponding author (anthies@cardiff.ac.uk).
VII. FUTURE WORK
Given the positive findings of the initial study, the next step
is to implement this system in real time, so that it can be
deployed in a real, much larger, heterogeneous IoT and even
Industrial IoT environment. This will allow the system to be
further evaluated on more complex and more sophisticated
attacks. Moreover, in order to bypass the extensive need of
feature engineering and date labeling, deep learning techniques
can also be applied to automatically determine which packet
features have an impact on the identification of malicious
activity within the IoT environment.
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APPENDIX
Features
len icmp.respin
caplen icmp.respto
frame.encaptype data.len
frame.offsetshift ssl.record.contenttype
frame.len ssl.record.version
frame.caplen ssl.record.length
frame.marked arp.hw.type
frame.ignored arp.proto.type
eth.lg arp.hw.size
eth.ig arp.proto.size
ip.version arp.opcode
ip.hdrlen http.response.code
ip.dsfield.dscp http.contentlength
ip.dsfield.ecn http.response
ip.src http.responsenumber
ip.dst http.request
ip.len http.requestnumber
ip.flags classicstun.type
ip.flags.rb classicstun.length
ip.flags.df udp.srcport
ip.flags.mf udp.dstport
ip.fragoffset udp.length
ip.ttl udp.checksum.status
ip.proto udp.stream
ip.checksum.status dns.flags.response
tcp.srcport dns.flags.opcode
tcp.dstport dns.flags.truncated
tcp.stream dns.flags.recdesired
tcp.len dns.flags.z
tcp.seq dns.flags.checkdisable
tcp.nxtseq dns.flags.rcode
tcp.ack dns.count.queries
tcp.hdrlen dns.count.answers
tcp.flags.res dns.count.authrr
tcp.flags.ns dns.qry.name.len
tcp.flags.cwr dns.count.labels
tcp.flags.ecn dns.resp.type
tcp.flags.urg dns.resp.class
tcp.flags.ack dns.resp.ttl
tcp.flags.push dns.resp.len
tcp.flags.reset igmp.version
tcp.flags.syn igmp.type
tcp.flags.fin igmp.maxresp
tcp.windowsizevalue igmp.checksum.status
tcp.windowsize ntp.flags.li
tcp.windowsizescalefactor ntp.flags.vn
tcp.checksum.status ntp.flags.mode
tcp.urgentpointer ntp.stratum
tcp.options.nop ntp.ppoll
tcp.options.mssval ntp.rootdelay
tcp.options.sackperm ntp.rootdispersion
tcp.analysis.bytesinf light ntp.precision
tcp.analysis.pushbytessent bootp.type
tcp.payload bootp.hw.type
icmp.type bootp.hw.len
icmp.code bootp.hops
icmp.ident bootp.secs
icmp.checksum.status bootp.flags.bc
icmp.seq bootp.flags.reserved
icmp.seqle bootp.dhcp
TABLE IX: Packet features
